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Abstract 
The language of Section 212(e) of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(f), contains a 
sweeping authorization of presidential discretion to suspend and restrict alien entry into the United States. 
Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) first introduced the subsection in 1950 as part of the omnibus immigration bill 
drafted by his Judiciary Committee’s immigration subcommittee. The specific origins of the language and the 
original intent behind the subsection remain missing pieces in the extensive scholarly literature on the 1952 INA 
and legislative history as explored by the courts. This article reveals that the subcommittee modeled the 
subsection on the sixth proviso of the 1917 Immigration Act, the May 1918 Wartime Measure, and a selective 
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. The article reveals further that the original intent behind the 
subsection was to close perceived loopholes in existing law enabling entry by displaced persons and Communist 
governmental officials. 
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On April 25, 1952, the last day of the House floor debate over the McCarran-Walter omnibus 
immigration bill (H.R. 5678), Representative Abraham Multer (D-NY) introduced what he described as a 
“simple” amendment.1 For well over a year, opponents in the House and Senate had argued against 
the bill’s provisions with little effect. With the rival Humphrey-Lehman immigration bill stalled in the 
Senate, Multer and Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) turned to a last-ditch effort to modify 
McCarran-Walter. Multer’s amendment focused on the bill’s controversial Section 212(e), which, he 
noted, posited “that at any time the President finds the entry of any aliens or class of aliens would be 
detrimental to the interests of the United States he may by proclamation suspend the entry of those 
aliens.” The amendment called for language limiting such authority to “when the United States is at 
war or during a national emergency declared by the President.”2 
Other provisions under McCarran-Walter had reaffirmed and expanded existing law on specific 
categories of aliens excluded from entering the country. Yet Section 212(e) was different. The House 
Judiciary Committee’s Report to accompany H.R. 5678 released in February 1952 revealed no 
counterpart to the proposed subsection in existing law.3 In the report’s minority opinion, Celler wrote 
that 212(e) was “an abdication by Congress of the control of immigration” and a “dangerous 
substitution of government by law, by government by man.”4 Speaking on behalf of the Multer 
amendment two months later, Celler reiterated these themes and expressed his concern that with 
such language “the President is given an untrammeled right, an uninhibited right to suspend 
immigration entirely.”5 The Multer amendment failed as did similar efforts to change the language in 
the Senate.6 The broad authority under Section 212(e) remained in McCarran-Walter becoming part of 
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and is now known as 8 U.S.C. §1182(f). 
Despite the extensive scholarship on the origins and impact of the 1952 INA in American immigration 
policy, this portion of the act and particularly the intent of those who drafted and supported this 
measure remain underexplored. The literature on McCarran-Walter includes detailed analyses of the 
omnibus bill’s reaffirmation of the national-origins quota system as well as steps ending exclusion and 
extension of quotas to Asians, expanding excludable and deportable classes of aliens, and removing 
racial, national, and gendered barriers to citizenship.7 Scholars have broadly traced the origins of 
McCarran-Walter to the work of Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) and the special investigative 
immigration subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee coordinated by his staff director Richard 
Arens.8 Yet the specific origins of the language and the original intent behind Section 212(e) remain 
missing pieces in this literature. 
Similarly, the legislative history of §1182(f) as explored by the courts has done little to fill this 
gap.9 Before 2017, the most important piece of the “limited case law” on the subsection was the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s brief discussion in the 1993 Sale v. Haitian Center Council Inc. concerning President 
George W. Bush’s Executive Order on the interdiction of Haitian refugees.10 Writing for the majority, 
Justice John Paul Stevens noted that the statute “granted the President ample power to establish a 
naval blockade” to deny entry to “illegal Haitian migrants.”11 But neither the majority nor dissenting 
justices delved into the origins of the statute’s language or the original congressional intent.12 Although 
case law on §1182(f) increased dramatically in 2017 with the legal challenges to President Donald J. 
Trump’s travel ban, these gaps remained. Unlike in Sale, the courts in 2017 and 2018 in Hawaii et al. v. 
Trump et al., and Trump et al. v. Hawaii et al. looked more closely into the origins of this subsection in 
McCarran-Walter. Yet as discussed below in addressing origins, both the Ninth District and U.S. 
Supreme Court limited their focus to, and drew contending interpretations from, only one small part of 
floor debate over the Multer amendment.13 
In contrast to the conventional focus on McCarran-Walter by scholars and the courts, this article 
reveals that understanding the language and intent behind §1182(f) requires a wider exploratory net. 
As discussed below, McCarran first introduced Section 212(e) on April 20, 1950, as part of the omnibus 
immigration bill, S. 3455, drafted by the Judiciary Committee’s immigration subcommittee he chaired. 
The full text of 212(e) proposed that: 
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the 
United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States he may by 
proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary suspend the entry of all aliens or 
any class of aliens be they immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any 
restrictions he may deem appropriate.”14 
This is the language that survived the subsequent deliberative process intact and became §1182(f). 
I argue that McCarran and the subcommittee modeled the language of this subsection on three 
sources. The first was an obsolete provision of presidential discretionary authority over entry by 
Japanese laborers introduced in 1907 and later reaffirmed under the 1917 Immigration Act. The 
second was existing presidential authority by proclamation over alien entry and exit during periods of 
war and national emergency under the May 1918 Wartime Measure, as amended. The third was a 
selective interpretation of Supreme Court decisions on congressional and presidential authority over 
alien entry. 
Compared to constraints on discretion under existing law, the sweeping presidential authority to 
suspend or restrict entry proposed under Section 212(e) was new, and as such poses a puzzle as to the 
drafters’ intent. Through the 1940s, Congress had fought a series of battles seeking to rein in President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s legacy of expanding executive branch power. Measures such as the 1946 
Administrative Procedure Act introduced extensive congressional oversight of federal administrative 
agencies’ procedures and practices.15 As McCarran argued on March 12, 1946, on behalf of the 
Committee of the Judiciary in support of the proposed act, “The law is the thing that makes democracy 
vital. This is not a Government of men. It is a Government of law.”16 Years later the irony of McCarran’s 
shift from this position to the sweeping language of Section 212(e) in McCarran-Walter was not lost on 
the immigration bill’s opponents.17 
As seen above, Celler’s minority opinion in the House Judiciary Committee’s Report on McCarran-
Walter used McCarran’s words on the importance of law and the need for limits on executive power to 
argue against 212(e). In the Senate, Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) and Herbert Lehman (D-NY) pointedly 
argued that the McCarran-Walter supporters were “among those who constantly are speaking of 
usurpation of power by the Executive and of the importance of constitutional checks and of the due 
process of law.”18 Similarly, the Truman administration’s legislative review of the proposed INA 
observed that language on sweeping presidential authority in McCarran-Walter’s Section 212(e) 
contrasted with “provisions which would tend to place the Executive agencies concerned with 
immigration [specifically the State Department’s Visa Division and the Justice Department’s 
Immigration and Naturalization Service] under closer supervision and control by the Congress.”19 
I argue that the intent of McCarran and the subcommittee with the language of 212(e) was twofold. 
First, the language was intended as a counterweight to presidential actions and congressional 
legislation expanding entry for displaced persons, especially European Jewish refugees. For members 
of the subcommittee, these aliens posed cultural, criminal, subversive, and other threats to the United 
States. Second, the language was intended to address loopholes in existing law seen by the 
subcommittee as allowing Communists to enter the country under the protected class of foreign 
governmental officials. McCarran and the subcommittee introduced the language of Section 212(e) as 
an additional layer of restriction to address these shortcomings. 
The remainder of this article expands on these arguments. The first section explores the origins of the 
subsection’s language and how it was modeled on existing law and selective interpretations of 
decisions by the Supreme Court. The second section addresses the original intent of the immigration 
subcommittee in introducing the language by tracing subcommittee concerns to earlier and concurrent 
debates over displaced-persons legislation and fears of subversive entry through loopholes for foreign 
officials in existing law. The third section extends the analysis beyond the first introduction of the 
subsection in 1950 and turns to two incidents in the final congressional floor debates over McCarran-
Walter that offer further insights into the issue of original intent. 
THE ORIGINS OF 212(E) LANGUAGE 
Drawing on a “historical-institutionalist approach,” Daniel Tichenor argues that the provisions of 
McCarran-Walter are best understood through the lens of Cold War pressures and powerful 
restrictionist “’committee barons’” able to block the efforts of expanding coalitions of immigration 
defenders and expert challenges to the racial necessity of alien exclusion.20 This approach offers a 
useful starting point. McCarran clearly epitomized the restrictive congressional committee 
baron.21 McCarran filled the immigration subcommittee with restrictionist anticommunist members of 
the Judiciary Committee, including James Eastland (D-MS), and relied on his like-minded staff such as 
Arens to manage the subcommittee’s investigations. As discussed below, Arens played a lead role in 
conducting subcommittee hearings on displaced persons and subversive aliens, drafting the 
subcommittee’s omnibus immigration bill and its accompanying report, and in subsequent Senate 
hearings over McCarran-Walter. 
That McCarran and the immigration subcommittee were responsible for the omnibus bill still begs the 
question of how they derived the language for 212(e). The answer to this question is all the more 
difficult given that no explicit discussion of the subsection’s origins appears in the subcommittee’s 
detailed, 900-plus page report accompanying the omnibus bill or in subsequent hearings or 
testimony.22 Scholars of American political development point to the impact of institutionalized past 
choices as well as agency of political actors on the direction of policy.23 The legislative history of the 
origins of the omnibus bill suggests that both were at play in the case of 212(e). For McCarran and the 
immigration subcommittee, the 1917 and 1924 Immigration acts comprised the primary baseline of 
existing law on exclusion and admissibility and were emblematic of its problems. Moreover, the 
subcommittee report argued that an omnibus bill was necessary in light of the additional “200 
additional legislative enactments . . . a number of treaties, Executive orders, proclamations, and a great 
many rules, regulations, and operations instructions” on immigration, not including the array of 
measures on naturalization.24 Using the comprehensive immigration acts as the framework on which to 
build a new omnibus bill allowed the subcommittee to argue to other members of Congress that they 
were retaining the best of existing law while addressing its critical gaps. Reviewing the legislative 
history of McCarran’s 1950 omnibus bill suggests that the subcommittee modeled the language of 
Section 212(e) on the following sources: the sixth proviso of the 1917 Immigration Act; the May 1918 
Wartime Measure, as amended; and selective interpretations of U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the 
plenary power of Congress and the Executive to restrict alien entry. 
The Comprehensive Acts 
The immigration subcommittee report framed the issue of alien entry in terms of two categories, 
excludable and admissible aliens. The subcommittee used the 1917 Immigration Act, especially Section 
3, as its primary entry point into the subject of excludable aliens. This section listed multiple classes of 
aliens automatically denied entry, such as convicted criminals, paupers, and the mentally and 
physically infirm. But the section also listed a series of provisos that established “exceptions to the 
excludable classes,” such as persons convicted of political offenses, and “all aliens who were accredited 
officials of foreign governments, and their suites, families, or guests.”25 The subcommittee report 
explored each of the excludable classes and the provisos in detail and discussed recommendations for 
changes under a proposed omnibus bill. These changes included expanding the number and scope of 
the excludable classes, particularly to include Communists and other subversives, and narrowing the 
exceptions to exclusion.26 
The subcommittee used the 1924 Immigration Act as its baseline for addressing the relative 
admissibility of aliens based on their national origin. The act distinguished between quota immigrants 
subject to annual limits on entry and nonquota immigrants, primarily from the Western hemisphere, 
who were exempt from the national-origins quota system. Nonimmigrant aliens such as tourists and 
visitors, those in transit, foreign government officials, and alien seamen were also exempt from the 
national-origins quotas.27 The subcommittee report reviewed each of these categories and offered 
recommendations on ways in which the system should be modified under the omnibus bill. The 
subcommittee reaffirmed the basic structure of the national-origins system, especially its privileging of 
Northern and Western Europeans, added Asians to the system by allowing limited alien entry from the 
“Asia-Pacific triangle,” and emphasized the need for denying access to those aliens who regardless of 
their immigrant, nonimmigrant, and/or protected status fell within the excludable classes as defined by 
the subcommittee’s proposed changes to the 1917 Act.28 
The subcommittee report’s primary reference to language that would become Section 212(e) appeared 
in the discussion of modifying the sixth proviso in Section 3 of the 1917 Act.29 The report described this 
proviso as unique. It was “the only one [in the 1917 Act] that permits the prohibition of certain aliens 
rather than the entry of otherwise excludable aliens.”30 The proviso empowered the President to 
prohibit entry by aliens seeking to access the continental United States through third countries, U.S. 
insular possessions, or the Panama Canal zone, when he was “satisfied” that passports issued by 
foreign governments were “being used” for such a “purpose . . . to the detriment of labor conditions 
therein.”31 The proviso’s language contained no conditions limiting discretionary authority to war or 
proclamations of national emergency, nor did it contain any criteria for presidential determinations of 
detrimental effect. 
The subcommittee report noted that the members had learned from a representative of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service that the language of the sixth proviso actually predated 
1917.32 Appearing in the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, the Gentleman’s Agreement between 
the United States and Japan, and President Theodore Roosevelt’s Executive Order 589 of March 14, 
1907, the language was intended to target Japanese laborers evading exclusion by entering the U.S. 
through Mexico, Canada, and Hawaii.33 The report noted that subsequent changes in immigration law 
and practice had solved this problem. The introduction of the national-origins quota system and 
restrictive visa provisions under the 1924 Immigration Act addressed the transit practice, and the 
changing relationship with Japan had included President Harry Truman’s revocation of Roosevelt’s 
original Executive Order in October 1948.34 
As a result, the subcommittee concluded that the sixth proviso was no longer necessary and the 
subcommittee report called for its deletion. But in the report’s next sentence the subcommittee noted 
that the omnibus immigration bill would be adding new language in place of the sixth proviso. Without 
any further explanation or detail, the report stated that “a general provision is being included in the 
proposed [omnibus] law to permit the President to suspend any and all immigration whenever he finds 
such action to be desirable in the best interest of the country.”35 In the report’s appendix summarizing 
provisions of the omnibus bill, the subcommittee noted further that “the President is given the power 
to suspend or restrict entry of any alien or class of aliens whose admission he finds to be detrimental 
to the interests of the United States.”36 Like that of the sixth proviso, this language linked discretionary 
authority to restrict alien entry to presidential determinations of detrimental effect. But the new 
provision was much broader. 
Discretionary Authority in Wartime or Proclamations of National Emergency 
Although the sixth proviso informed the language of the Section 212(e), the model for the mechanism 
of presidential proclamation to invoke such discretionary authority over alien entry found in the 
subsection lies elsewhere. Here the subcommittee appeared to turn to language found in existing law 
imposing “extraordinary controls” on subversive aliens in times of war and national emergency.37 The 
subcommittee observed that as early as 1798 the “concern of Congress” with subversion had resulted 
in laws authorizing the President to take such steps against subversive aliens by proclamation in the 
name of “public safety.”38 Where the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 had focused on “the alien resident in 
time of war or threatened invasion,” subsequent acts of Congress had included authority to impose 
additional controls on alien entry.39 Under the May 22, 1918, Wartime Immigration Act, as amended 
June 21, 1941, Congress authorized the President to exclude aliens “upon finding it in the interests of 
the United States” during periods of war or presidential proclamation of national 
emergency.40 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had proclaimed such an emergency on May 27, 1941, and 
called for additional controls on alien entry by “Proclamation 2523 on November 14, 1941.”41 The 
subcommittee report noted further that regulations introduced by the Attorney General at this time 
“continue in effect as part of the immigration laws, since the national emergency has never been 
terminated and a state of war still exists.”42 
Recent public scholarship on Section 212(e) contends that its origins lie in the long history of existing 
law, as reviewed by the immigration subcommittee in its report, empowering the President to restrict 
alien entry by proclamation in times of war and national emergency.43 This claim is only partially 
correct. The subcommittee explicitly included the language of the May 22, 1918, Wartime Immigration 
Act, as amended, in the 1950 omnibus immigration bill as Section 216(a),44 and discussed this linkage in 
the report.45 Yet, the subcommittee made no such link between this history and 212(e), either as a 
basic peacetime version of wartime presidential authority or a step necessitated by the pending end of 
the wartime state of emergency.46 Instead, the subcommittee added portions of the language on 
presidential proclamation to the framework of the sixth proviso. 
Plenary Power 
A third possible source for the sweeping language of Section 212(e) lies in the subcommittee’s reading 
of court decisions at the time of the report’s preparation.47 Drawing on the Supreme Court’s January 
16, 1950, arguments in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, as grounded in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the 
subcommittee report contended: “It is well established by decisions of the Supreme Court that every 
sovereign nation has the power, inherent in its sovereignty, to forbid the entrance of aliens or to admit 
them upon such conditions as it may prescribe.”48 But where the court in Knauff went on to emphasize 
that such authority was “inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation,” 
the subcommittee report adopted a different tack.49 Drawing on the court’s 1914 ruling in Lapina v. 
Williams, the subcommittee stressed that “the authority of Congress over the admission of aliens [to 
the United States] is plenary.”50 Congress may “exclude them all together or prescribe the terms upon 
which they may enter and remain in the country.”51 
Earlier sections of the subcommittee report dealing with excludable classes were written before 
the Knauff ruling.52 Here the subcommittee pointed to the 1889 Chinese exclusion case of Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, where “the Supreme Court held that the power of the Congress to exclude aliens 
from the country is an incident of sovereignty.”53 The subcommittee argued further that “the courts 
have also held that it is proper for the Congress to delegate its power to control immigration to officials 
who may have discretionary power and who are made sole and exclusive judges of the existence of 
facts concerning the entrance of immigrants under the immigration laws.”54 
These arguments reinforced a central theme in the subcommittee report that the “concern of 
Congress” had been at the forefront of existing law empowering the President to address threats to 
public safety posed by alien entry.55 Citing this plenary power, the subcommittee presented its 
recommendations for “additional restrictions on alien subversives” to be included in the omnibus 
bill.56 These recommendations included expanding the discretionary power of consular officials, the 
Commissioner of Immigration, the Attorney General, and, as discussed below in cases of foreign 
government officials, the President.57 Yet, once again the report made no mention of the language of 
Section 212(e) in this context. That said, the subcommittee’s interpretation of the plenary power of 
Congress over alien admission would allow for the creation of such language empowering the 
President to restrict alien entry on determination that such entry was detrimental to the United States. 
THE TARGETS OF DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION 
On the surface, the language of Section 212(e) was a blanket authorization to restrict alien entry. But 
this interpretation fails to capture the subcommittee’s concerns with particular groups. In hearings 
held by the subcommittee from 1947 to 1950, references to the threat posed by two groups stood out: 
refugees, especially European Jews and Communist subversives entering the United States through the 
refugee process; and Communist subversive foreign government officials and representatives of 
international organizations entering the United States through proviso loopholes in the 1917 
Immigration Act, as amended, and the 1945 International Organizations Immunities Act. 
The Refugee Threat 
By the late 1940s, McCarran and the immigration subcommittee were at the forefront of efforts in the 
Senate to limit the entry of displaced persons into the United States. These efforts came in the context 
of earlier restrictionist successes during the 1930s in blocking access by the rising number of displaced 
persons in Europe. Congressional backlash and opposition within the Department of State had stymied 
efforts by advocates of admission for predominantly Jewish refugees from Germany during the late 
1930s and early 1940s.58 In 1944, President Roosevelt took a different tack by establishing the War 
Refugee Board by Executive Order 9417 of January 22 and announcing to Congress on June 12 that an 
emergency, temporary shelter for up to one thousand refugees had been established at Fort Ontario in 
Oswego, New York.59 Senator Rufus C. Holman (R-OR), a noted anti-Semite and restrictionist, captured 
the opposition’s reaction as he challenged the constitutionality of such a step “to set aside and violate 
the laws of Congress restricting immigration into our country.”60 
On December 22, 1945, President Harry S. Truman took further action. Noting the magnitude of the 
population dislocation problem in Europe and the important but “small” steps at Fort Oswego, Truman 
issued a Directive on Immigration calling for the establishment of “consular facilities at or near 
displaced persons and refugee assembly centers in the American zones of occupation” in Europe. 
Consular officials would determine eligibility for immigration under existing national origin quotas and 
provisions on excludable classes as well as “simplify” and “hasten the process of issuing visas.”61 Yet by 
working within the existing quota system and relying on officials resistant to expanded immigration, 
the impact of the directive was limited to “only 5,000 displaced persons” admitted “in the first nine 
months of 1946.”62 Dissatisfaction over these results prompted calls by Truman and supporters of 
displaced persons for new legislative efforts beginning in 1947 that culminated in the 1948 Displaced 
Person Act (DPA).63 
McCarran, along with Senator Chapman Revercomb (R-WV), comprised the initial core of the Judiciary 
Committee’s special immigration subcommittee, established on July 26, 1947, to investigate the state 
of the country’s immigration laws and to prepare a separate report on the displaced persons 
issue.64 The latter took initial priority.65 The subcommittee report and accompanying displaced persons 
bill introduced in the Senate on March 2, 1948, set a baseline for a more restrictionist response to the 
displaced persons problem. The report noted that refugees were suspect as Communist subversives 
and a likely economic burden on the United States. Moreover, the report stated that refugees 
predominantly consisted of Jews that were manipulating the displaced-persons eligibility process 
through fraud, few being left in the occupation zones by the date of Truman’s 1945 directive, and 
through undue political influence by their wealthy supporters.66 Similar themes had been raised by 
Arens during his questioning of witnesses during an early July 1947 subcommittee hearing over a bill to 
allow the entry of displaced persons orphaned by the war.67 To address these perceived shortcomings, 
the subcommittee bill included restrictive measures such as limiting the numbers of displaced persons 
to one hundred thousand over two years and restricting access to those “people registered as 
displaced persons” as of December 22, 1945.68 The final congressional compromise in the DPA retained 
this eligibility date with few exceptions, but doubled the overall cap by counting refugee admissions 
against future national quotas—in other words, letting in more refugees from countries otherwise 
limited by reducing, in theory, how many could come from those countries in future years.69 Truman 
“reluctantly” signed the DPA on June 25, 1948, observing that it “discriminates in callous fashion 
against displaced persons of the Jewish faith.”70 Shortly thereafter, supporters of displaced persons 
turned to efforts to amend the DPA. 
McCarran worked hard to derail these efforts using his position as chair of the Judiciary Committee 
from 1949 on to delay consideration of proposed legislation.71 Michael Ybarra writes that opposition to 
access by displaced Jews, and to Jews more broadly, underpinned McCarran’s legislative efforts and 
public rhetoric about the threat of Communist subversives and other undesirables posing as 
refugees.72 After multiple delaying tactics in 1949 and with an array of restrictionist amendments, the 
deliberations over refugee legislation finally made it out of committee to the Senate floor in early 
1950. McCarran again worked to derail legislation with more delays and amendments but ultimately 
without success. In early April, the Senate passed a new displaced-persons bill expanding refugee 
access.73 
After Senator Revercomb lost his seat in the 1948 elections, McCarran became chair of the immigration 
subcommittee as well as the Judiciary Committee in 1949.74 During subcommittee hearings over 
displaced persons held from March 1949 through March 1950, McCarran had Arens take the lead in 
selecting witnesses and using targeted questions to make the case against any expansion of refugee 
access. Arens and McCarran repeatedly utilized witness testimony during the hearings to point to the 
number of Jews admitted under the DPA as proof that the act was not discriminatory. They also turned 
to the same numbers to stress that Jews in large numbers were using fraudulent documents to falsely 
claim presence in the allied occupied zones before the Truman Directive date necessary for 
eligibility.75 Arens utilized witness testimony from subpoenaed members and disgruntled former 
members of the Displaced Persons Commission to raise questions of Jewish influence over the 
leadership and decision-making processes in determining eligibility, pressuring consular and 
immigration officials, and directing efforts to amend the DPA.76 Arens and members of the 
subcommittee such as James Eastland rejected the distinction made by commissioners between 
displaced persons turning to limited black market participation to survive and large-scale illicit 
activities, arguing that such distinctions masked widespread criminal proclivity among Jewish refugees 
in addition to their alleged document fraud.77 Finally, subcommittee members repeatedly posed 
questions, and echoed supporting answers, about the inherent threats in changing the baseline dates 
for eligibility as opening the door to even greater threats of Jewish and other Communist subversives 
entering the United States under the guise of displaced persons.78 
Arens and McCarran vehemently rejected or simply ignored the efforts by the few witnesses such as 
Celler who tried to push back against the tenor of the hearings.79As Arens noted after a particularly 
contentious exchange with Harry Rosenfield of the Displaced Persons Commission, “every patriotic 
American in this country ought to get on his knees every night and thank the Good Lord that we have 
the senior senator from Nevada who has been waging this fight against tremendous odds and against a 
million dollar lobby. . . . There is no question but what there is a complete breakdown in the 
administration of this law, so that black marketers, subversives, criminals, undesirables are gaining 
admission into this country.” 80 
The subcommittee hearings continued through March 1950, reaffirming conclusions that Arens and 
McCarran had already reached on the need for restrictive measures against displaced persons. The 
Judiciary Committee had already submitted its version of the House bill amending the DPA along with a 
supporting report drafted by Arens on January 25, and the Senate floor debate over the bill began on 
February 28.81 At the same time as McCarran was fighting a losing battle to derail the DPA, the 
immigration subcommittee was working on its larger report in support of McCarran’s draft omnibus 
immigration bill.82 
The final report of the immigration subcommittee that accompanied the omnibus immigration bill was 
less strident on the refugee issue but in several ways reaffirmed earlier arguments that the country 
was at risk. The subcommittee posited the national-origins quota system as an essential part of the 
omnibus immigration bill, acknowledging and approving the fact that this system had privileged 
Western and Northern Europeans and tightly restricted entry of less “assimilable” aliens from Southern 
and Eastern European countries.83 The subcommittee further noted the dramatic rise of “new” 
immigrant populations dominated by “Italians, the Slavs and Jews.”84 The discussion of Jewish 
immigration was particularly slanted conveying a rising threat. The report mixed an array of baselines 
and trends noting, for example, that: while Jews comprised less than 4 percent of the U.S. population 
in 1937, they accounted for “between 25 and 77 percent of total net immigration” since that time. 
Moreover, their population growth since 1877 of 21 percent had outstripped that of the overall United 
States by a factor of seven and had increased 2.5 million since 1881.85 The report also noted that 
Jewish refugees accounted for 26 percent of those admitted under the 1948 DPA.86  
The report made only brief additional references to the refugee issue. For example, one section noted 
the visa set-asides in the 1948 DPA for refugees who had worked in agriculture and were likely to 
continue to do so in the United States as precedent for adding greater occupational “selectivity” in 
future immigration law.87 Yet no mention was made that McCarran and Revercomb had introduced 
this provision in 1948 as way of discriminating against Jews who were less likely to qualify due to other 
occupational pursuits.88 The subcommittee report also briefly discussed displaced persons in the 
context of the national-origins quotas. Although the initial impact of DPA legislation would be 
temporary, the report stated, refugee access created “confusion” in the distribution of preference 
categories for a given country and mortgaged alien entry against future quotas.89 Moreover, refugee 
provisions would clash with other set-asides in the Austrian and German national-origin quotas for 
ethnic Germans under the 1948 DPA. The report made no mention of the contentious issue of Jewish 
discrimination or the efforts of McCarran and subcommittee members to reclassify ethnic Germans 
born in Eastern European countries as displaced persons and therefore eligible for entry under the 
DPA.90 
McCarran’s losing battle against displaced-persons legislation helps to explain why the subcommittee 
included Section 212(e) in the omnibus bill. In 1944 and 1945, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman had 
used the power of the office to circumvent congressional opposition and existing law to expand access 
for displaced persons. The language of 212(e) offered a future restrictionist president a way to stop 
refugees from coming into the United States. The linkage and the immigration subcommittee’s focus 
on the threats posed by Jewish displaced persons was not lost on the opposition. Jewish groups had 
been at the forefront of lobbying on behalf of the 1948 DPA and its expansion.91 By 1951 they were 
continuing this role in public hearings over McCarran’s omnibus immigration bill, calling attention to 
and opposing the unprecedented expansion of presidential authority proposed in Section 
212(e).92 Jewish members of Congress, including McCarran’s primary opponent in the 1950 refugee 
clash, Senator Lehman, as well as Celler and Multer in the House, were also among the leading voices 
challenging the sweeping language of 212(e).93 
Foreign Officials and the Subversive Threat 
The immigration subcommittee’s focus on inroads of alien subversion was not limited to displaced 
persons. During the late 1940s, McCarran was also at the forefront of efforts in the Senate to introduce 
legislation informed by the subcommittee’s investigations of how loopholes in existing immigration law 
had intensified the Communist threat to national security. Part III of the subcommittee’s final report on 
immigration focused on “Subversives.” Here the subcommittee framed its analysis of Communism as 
“an alien force,” “an international conspiracy” that was infiltrating “our borders for the purpose of 
overthrowing the democratic Government of the United States by force, violence, and 
subversion.”94 Based on the subcommittee’s recommendations, the omnibus immigration bill added 
multiple categories for Communists and other subversives to the classes of aliens excluded from 
entry.95 However, the subcommittee also argued that as long as exceptions to exclusion existed that 
offered paths to entry to Communists, simply expanding the scope of excludable classes was not 
enough. These other paths had to be addressed. 
Based on its investigations, the subcommittee noted the lack of restrictions on foreign government 
officials and representatives of international organizations as a particular security threat.96 Specifically, 
the 1917 Immigration Act’s tenth proviso had exempted “accredited officials of foreign government 
officials” along with “their suites, families, or guests” from the classes of exclusion.97 The 1924 
Immigration Act designated such persons as nonimmigrants, exempt from the visa provisions affecting 
quota and nonquota immigrants, and made no change in their exemption from exclusion.98 In 
December 1945, the International Organization Immunities Act extended these privileges to officers 
and employees of organizations and their immediate family members.99 
The subcommittee began to target these loopholes in 1949. On April 25, McCarran introduced 
legislation, S. 1694, to better exclude and deport subversive aliens.100 Noting the initial findings of the 
immigration subcommittee, McCarran argued that subversive Communist aliens, coordinated by the 
Kremlin, were taking advantage of lax immigration laws to infiltrate the United States. McCarran 
emphasized the “backdoors” of “exceptions and provisos” in existing law for representatives of 
international organizations and commissions. These enabled entries by aliens who were feeding the 
communist “lifeline” in the United States and supporting the “fifth column” threat to national security. 
Responding to this threat, he argued, would require an expansion of “government power” to “plug the 
loopholes” in existing law.101 McCarran’s bill, subsumed with more detail on May 11 into a second 
McCarran bill, S. 1832, proposed amending existing law on anarchist exclusion and expulsion to 
address the subversive threat.102  
The subcommittee based the McCarran bills on the Immigration Act of October 16, 1918, as amended, 
which had expanded the scope of excludable and deportable aliens on grounds of anarchistic behaviors 
and affiliations beyond that first introduced in 1903.103 McCarran’s bill S. 1832 established a broader 
category of activities “subversive to national security” and authorized the Attorney General to 
determine the parameters of this category as well as identify “every [subversive] association, society, 
and group” “on the basis of evidence satisfactory to him.”104 The bill further empowered the Attorney 
General to exclude and deport, without limitation or interference, “any alien,” including tenth proviso 
aliens, he “knows or believes” to be seeking to enter, or has entered, the United States to engage in 
subversive activities.105 
During public hearings over the next five months, the subcommittee questioned witnesses who 
expounded on the Communist threat and called for action along the lines of the McCarran bill.106 As in 
the DPA hearings, Arens coordinated the witnesses and had them repeat and expand on portions of 
their testimony when it supported the subcommittee’s concerns.107 Communists and former 
Communists appearing under subpoena responded in the affirmative when Arens asked whether 
subversives were entering the United States as “affiliates or invitees of the United Nations” and other 
international organizations, and the extent to which “Communist activities in the United States are 
under the direction, control and supervision of the officials of iron-curtain countries who are in the 
United States.”108 L. Paul Wining, General Counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and 
consultant to the subcommittee in drafting the McCarran bill, pointed to the constraining effects of the 
tenth proviso on excluding alien subversives.109 The subcommittee also subpoenaed the Secretary of 
State and the Attorney General for access to information in files on officials and employees of foreign 
governments and the United Nations engaged in subversive activity in the United States.110 Arens used 
subsequent testimony by AG Thomas Clark and State Department representatives to repeatedly call 
attention to the tenth proviso and the ease of access by subversive foreign officials.111 
Despite the extensive hearings, McCarran’s bill went no further in 1949. As part of a delaying tactic on 
the revisions of the DPA, McCarran had left the country from mid-September to early December for a 
tour of Europe to assess the displaced persons issue.112 With McCarran away, the subcommittee 
returned to drafting its immigration report and incorporated the findings of the hearings into brief 
chapters on the subversive threat and the shortfalls of existing law.113 As noted in the Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, the 1950 omnibus immigration bill “included all of S. 1832.”114 Yet this 
conclusion was incorrect. The subcommittee’s recommendations and the omnibus bill did not include 
the 1949 proposals for broadly empowering the Attorney General to exclude or deport any alien on 
grounds of subversion.115 Instead, the subcommittee’s approach had become more nuanced. 
The subcommittee report proposed narrowing the scope of the tenth proviso by disaggregating its 
privileged class. The subcommittee recommended that some previously protected aliens such as 
“guests” of foreign officials be removed from nonimmigrant status. Those remaining would be divided 
into subcategories to better allow for determinations of privilege and exemption from exclusion.116 The 
subcommittee proposed that the exclusion of high-level foreign officials and representatives, such as 
“Ambassadors, public ministers, and career diplomatic or consular officials,” would be the purview of 
the President.117 Specifically, the subcommittee proposed that the President be empowered to restrict 
entry for such officials “where it is known that they seek to enter the United States to engage in 
activities prejudicial to the public interest or which will endanger the public welfare or safety 
[emphasis added].”118 In language that would also be incorporated into the omnibus immigration bill, 
the subcommittee noted further that “Consistent with Constitutional limitations, such authority may 
be exercised only under such rules and regulations as the President deems to be necessary.”119 All 
other tenth proviso aliens could be denied entry by consular officials and the Commissioner of 
Immigration on less stringent standards.120 Here authorities could deny entry where the alien’s 
activities are “believed to be prejudicial [emphasis added]” or “where it is known or there is reason to 
believe [emphasis added]” their activities were “considered to be subversive to national security.”121 
Despite the extensive discussion of the recommended changes in executive authority to narrow the 
tenth proviso loophole, the subcommittee report made no reference to the ability of the President to 
restrict entry of the highest foreign officials and international organization representatives if their 
subversive intent was believed but not known. The sweeping language of Section 212(e) would give the 
President such authority. Yet the subcommittee report never explicitly made this argument; the closest 
it came was in summarizing the omnibus bill in the appendix. Here the report briefly reviewed the 
Section 3 provisos of the 1917 Act as “retained, modified, changed or repealed” in the omnibus 
bill.122 Only five remained of the original ten provisos and of these only two were unchanged. The 
summary noted that the exemption from exclusion for those convicted of a “purely political offense” 
and the exemption for “foreign-government and international organization officials” would be 
“continued.”123 Yet as discussed above, the summary was misleading as the latter exemption had been 
narrowed considerably. The next and last sentence of this part of the summary appeared as a catchall 
statement that had the potential to narrow entry by admissible aliens even further. Here the appendix 
inserted the summary language of 212(e) noted above: “The President is given the power to suspend 
or restrict entry of any alien or class of aliens whose admission he finds to be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States.”124 
REVISITING INTENT 
Although opponents of McCarran-Water repeatedly rejected Section 212(e), few examples exist of 
congressional supporters speaking on behalf of the proposed language. In April and May 1952, 
opposition efforts to amend McCarran-Walter in the final floor debates in the House and Senate 
included two incidents that offer further insight into the extent of presidential authority originally 
envisioned under subsection. The first is the debate over the Multer Amendment in the House, the 
second is the deal on technical amendments reached between McCarran and Humphrey in the Senate. 
Beyond broadly noting that last-ditch efforts to amend McCarran-Walter failed, scholars have paid 
little attention to either incident. In the 2017–18 travel ban cases, the courts narrowly turned to part of 
the first incident and made no mention of the other.125 
Backdrop 
Efforts to determine McCarran’s as well as broader congressional intent behind Section 212(e) in the 
legislative history from the time that he introduced the omnibus immigration bill in April 1950 to the 
final passage of McCarran-Walter are challenging at best. Deliberations over an array of internal-
security bills and investigations and the impact of the onset of the Korean War delayed hearings until 
March 1951.126 As subsequent iterations of the McCarran-Walter bill moved through Congress in 1951 
and early 1952, the original 1950 language of Section 212(e) remained unchanged.127 During this 
period, members of the subcommittee, the Judiciary Committee, and restrictionist supporters in the 
Senate and House lauded McCarran-Walter but made no mention of this specific provision of the bill in 
hearings or floor remarks. This pattern persisted even as opponents attacked the subsection as an 
unprecedented expansion of presidential power to restrict all immigration.128  
In the absence of a restrictionist response, the opposition moved beyond simply rejecting the measure 
and sought to fight a rearguard action limiting its potential impact. In hearings held on McCarran-
Walter in 1951, the House and Senate Judiciary Committee minority reports on McCarran-Walter 
released in early 1952, and days of floor testimony during May 1952, the opposition argued that any 
broad presidential authority to suspend or restrict immigration should be limited to times of war or 
declarations of national emergency.129 Furthermore, and as formally introduced in the rival Humphrey-
Lehman omnibus immigration bill on March 12, 1952, the opposition argued that if the President was 
to be granted the power to suspend or restrict entry, he should also be empowered to temporarily 
admit aliens when in the country’s interest.130 As this rival bill languished in McCarran’s Judiciary 
Committee, the opposition turned to amendments in the House and Senate to try and insert the same 
language into McCarran-Walter. 
The Multer Amendment Debate 
In the final House deliberations over amendments to McCarran-Walter on April 25, 1952, Multer 
introduced a two-part amendment to Section 212(e). The first limited presidential authority to suspend 
alien entry by proclamation, replacing “Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of 
any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States 
[emphasis added]” with “When the United States is at war or during the existence of a national 
emergency proclaimed by the President and [emphasis added].”131 The second part of the amendment 
proposed that when under the same conditions of war and national emergency “the President finds 
the entry or any aliens or any class of aliens into the United States would promote the interests of the 
United States, or is necessary to provide sanctuary to persecuted aliens or any class of aliens and would 
not be contrary to the best interests of the United States, he may by proclamation and for such period 
as he shall deem desirable, suspend such restrictions on the entry of aliens for temporary residence as 
he may deem appropriate [emphasis added].”132 
Four House members spoke against the amendment. Explicitly and implicitly, their underlying concern 
was the threat posed by refugees. Representatives Thomas A. Jenkins (R-OH) and Richard W. Hoffman 
(R-IL) viewed the second part of the amendment as empowering the President to “admit additional 
millions of aliens” that would be unlikely to ever leave.133 Representative Charles Halleck (R-IN) 
observed that the amendment would allow the President to end-run Congress and the limits on 
refugee admissions agreed to under the Displaced Persons Act.134 Multer acknowledged that this was 
in fact the case, though “only at certain times for limited periods.”135 In effect, the proposed language 
in the second part of the amendment would explicitly authorize action along the lines of the 
controversial steps to aid displaced persons taken by Roosevelt in 1944 and Truman in 1945 but on a 
potentially much larger scale. 
Walter was the most vehement in his opposition and the only one to explicitly defend the original 
language of Section 212(e). He began by chiding Multer for arguing that “the President should not have 
the power to exclude; then in the same breath he urges that we give the President the power to 
admit.”136 This argument was a response to the earlier efforts of the opposition to remove the 
subsection entirely from McCarran-Walter rather than addressing the more nuanced rearguard 
position. For Walter, the fact that the Multer amendment placed the same limiting conditions of war 
and national emergency on exclusion and admission mattered little. Walter argued further the 
presidential power to suspend entry under 212(e) was necessary to address emergency conditions 
such as an epidemic of “communicable diseases” in an alien source country or during “a period of great 
unemployment” in the United States where it would be “impossible for Congress to act” swiftly 
enough.137 Years later, the Ninth Circuit’s December 2017 ruling in the travel ban case used Walter’s 
statement to suggest that the original congressional intent behind 212(e) was for a narrow granting of 
presidential authority limited to periods of “exigency” where Congress would be “unable to act in 
timely manner, thus necessitating swift presidential action.”138 In turn, the U.S. Supreme Court in June 
2018 rejected the lower court argument as emphasizing an isolated floor statement over what it 
interpreted as the clear indication of broad congressional intent in the language of the subsection 
itself. Writing for the majority, Justice John Roberts noted: “When Congress wishes to condition the 
exercise of executive authority on the President’s finding of an exigency or crisis it knows how to say 
just that.”139 
Yet in exploring intent it is instructive to look further at the entire debate over the amendment, 
something neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court did in the travel ban cases in 2017 and 
2018. Walter’s examples in defense of the subsection were flawed. Existing law from 1917 as retained 
under McCarran-Walter in Section 212(a) already allowed for the exclusion of aliens “afflicted . . . 
[with] any dangerous contagious disease” and those likely to become a public charge such as “paupers, 
professional beggars, or vagrants.” Moreover, the bill had added new language to the same 
section excluding aliens seeking entry as “skilled or unskilled labor” where “sufficient workers” already 
existed in the United States or the “wages and working conditions” of such workers would be 
“adversely” affected.140 In effect, the mechanisms to address both of Walter’s scenarios were already 
in place without 212(e). However, as the McCarran subcommittee had noted repeatedly since the late 
1940s, displaced persons posed threats of disease and economic disruption along with the greater 
challenges of crime and subversion and were gaining entry to the United States despite laws on 
excludable classes.141 A constant theme in the subcommittee’s hearings was that efforts at tightening 
legislation and its implementation had failed due to the influence of the supporters of displaced 
persons. The Multer amendment reaffirmed this concern. 
Multer and Celler did not challenge the accuracy of Walter’s exigency arguments. Instead, they 
contended that the first part of the amendment was a necessary corrective to the “broad power” to 
restrict alien entry in 212(e). When Halleck asked Celler if he would be less “concerned” if he could 
assure “a President that could not do any wrong,” Celler replied that they likely shared a concern of 
any President having a “blank check” over immigration or “unlimited power on any subject.” Celler 
pointedly noted Halleck’s concerns over what Truman had done “recently” alluding to his controversial 
seizure of steel mills by Executive Order earlier in the month.142 This argument fell on deaf ears. Multer 
and Celler also tried to drop the controversial second part of the amendment from further 
consideration. Walter successfully objected to such a move, noting that “one amendment” with both 
of its parts was under consideration, and the amendment was rejected.143 
The Package Deal 
The second incident has received no attention from either scholars or the courts. On May 22, 1952, 
during the final day of the Senate floor debate, McCarran announced that he and Humphrey had 
reached a deal. They had discussed “the 153 to 157 amendments” to the omnibus immigration bill S. 
2550 and had reached an agreement on twenty-one “minor, technical amendments.” McCarran noted 
that he had agreed further that the amendments “may go to conference” and that he “would be willing 
to accept those amendments en bloc” if so approved by the Senate.144 Humphrey formally introduced 
the package of amendments reaffirming that they were “technical in nature,” that they had been 
“carefully checked by the respective staffs” and those “Senators who are particularly concerned,” such 
as Lehman.145 When asked by Humphrey to comment further, McCarran repeated that he had 
accepted amendments “which had been offered and did not change the policy or theme of the 
bill.”146 McCarran also reminded Humphrey, “the worth of the amendments will be considered 
carefully” in conference and might “not fit” into the places he intended though “may fit in some place” 
in the bill.147 The Senate approved the McCarran-Humphrey package of amendments without 
objection. Humphrey then asked and received confirmation that the amendments would be printed 
individually in the Congressional Record.148 
Yet aside from McCarran, Humphrey, their staffs, and others alluded to in Humphrey’s statement, it is 
not clear that anyone else at the time had read what had been proposed. Senator Leverett Saltonstall 
(R-MA) was the lone voice who commented on the proposal to approve the twenty-one amendments 
en bloc, and he simply asked for confirmation that they had all been agreed upon by Humphrey and 
the Judiciary Committee.149 If the amendments had been read on the Senate floor, it would have 
quickly become apparent that the package contained not only technical modifications but also some 
“significant changes” to McCarran-Walter.150 Of particular note, the sixth change in the McCarran-
Humphrey deal proposed “in subsection 212(e) to strike out ‘Whenever’ and insert in lieu thereof: 
‘When the United States is at war or during the existence of a national emergency proclaimed by the 
President and.’”151 In short, this was the part of the same fallback language demanded by the 
opposition since 1951 and that had failed in the House during the deliberations over the Multer 
Amendment. 
One interpretation of McCarran’s acceptance of such a change was that two years after the 
subsection’s drafting by the immigration subcommittee he no longer saw the language as that 
important. Although the alien threats remained, passage of the omnibus immigration bill was 
paramount. In a letter and fact sheet sent to Eastland in early May, McCarran had pointed to critical 
components of the bill under siege by opponents and the need for the bill’s passage. He did not 
mention the language of Section 212(e).152 In addition, compared to McCarran’s preferred presidential 
candidate, the restrictionist Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), neither of the leading contenders at the 
time for the upcoming 1952 elections, Dwight D. Eisenhauer and Estes Kefauver, were likely to invoke 
212(e).153 Thus, as McCarran had noted, the package deal contained only minor adjustments. 
However, a more plausible interpretation is that McCarran’s acceptance of the revision was an empty, 
tactical concession to facilitate the bill’s passage in the Senate. His comments to Humphrey regarding 
what could take place in conference support this view. Walter’s response to the Multer amendment 
the month before had also signaled that the technical change would not survive the House. McCarran 
handpicked the conference committee, “excluding liberals and moderates all together,” further 
assuring his desired result.154 Unsurprisingly, the technical amendment to Section 212(e) was not 
mentioned in either the Senate or House discussions of the conference committee report and did not 
appear in the conference version of McCarran-Walter.155 Section 212(e) as originally written in 1950 
remained intact. 
CONCLUSION 
The language of Section 212(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as passed in 1952 contains a 
sweeping authorization of presidential discretion to restrict alien entry into the United States. The 
subsection empowers the President to backstop existing law on classes of excludable aliens and 
override provisions on admissible aliens. Despite such authority and the potential for closing off all 
alien entry, the origins of this subsection have been understudied by scholars and largely overlooked 
by the courts. That the language of what would become the 1952 INA was initially drafted in toto by 
McCarran’s immigration subcommittee is well known. Yet the origins and subcommittee intent behind 
Section 212(e) are much less so. 
Drawing on a detailed analysis of the report accompanying McCarran’s 1950 omnibus immigration bill, 
this article reveals how the subcommittee modeled Section 212(e) on presidential discretionary 
authority over alien entry in the sixth proviso of the 1917 Immigration Act, presidential authority to 
restrict alien entry by proclamation under the May 1918 Wartime Measure, and a selective 
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent on congressional and presidential authority over alien 
entry. Insights into the reasons why the McCarran subcommittee added the language of Section 212(e) 
to the 1950 omnibus immigration bill lie in concerns with refugees and subversives. Casting a wider 
exploratory net beyond the subcommittee report, the article reveals the antipathy of the 
subcommittee to particular types of displaced persons and foreign government officials. In Jewish 
refugees, the subcommittee saw rising numbers of unassimilable aliens prone to criminal and 
subversive behavior. Moreover, their access had been facilitated by questionable presidential 
initiatives, flawed legislation, and implementation of vetting processes by a tainted and suspect 
Displaced Persons Commission. In foreign officials, the subcommittee saw the expansion of Communist 
networks as aliens used diplomatic privileges to exert direct influence over subversive activities in the 
United States. 
Existing law even as refined under other provisions of the McCarran omnibus bill would not be enough 
to address these threats. A future restrictionist president would require broader authority over 
curtailing alien entry. For McCarran and the subcommittee, there was no confusion or need for further 
clarification as to what the language of Section 212(e) entailed. As Celler feared, such authority was 
intended to be an untrammeled right. 
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